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Scotland and Brexit: the state of the Union and the union state 
Christopher McCorkindale, University of Strathclyde 
I. Introduction 
The constitution of the United Kingdom has always had something of a Jekyll and Hyde nature: an 
internal and uneasy tension between its unitary and union ƐƚĂƚĞ ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ? : DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?Ɛfamous 
ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞhŶŝŽŶƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚǁĂƐ  ‘ďŽƌŶƵŶĨƌĞĞ ?1 might be contested, but it reminds us that 
from its very inception the ability of the unitary state to hoard political power at the centre  W to 
sustain the claim that the legitimacy and authority of all other institutions flows from, through and 
back to2 the sovereign Crown-in-Parliament  W has depended upon the persuasion that a layer of 
constitutional protection exists in order to preserve the distinct civil, political and cultural identities 
of its constituent nations against the abuse of that power. Where the constituent nations are no 
longer so persuaded there the unitary state is confronted with a dilemma: to adapt or to fail.  
As a result of the 2016 EU Referendum the capacity of the UK constitution to straddle its unitary and 
union state identities is under strain. On the one hand, that the wish of the Scottish (as well as that 
of the Northern Irish) majority to remain in the EU was rendered impotent against the nationwide 
majority who voted to leave has caused some to reflect on a persistent democratic deficit at the 
centre.3 On the other hand, the way in which a political right with no mainstream counterpart in 
Scottish politics have taken control (though I use this term loosely!) of Brexit W aided and abetted by 
the disavowal of any responsibility on the political left either convincingly to make the case for 
remain or to present a compelling alternative vision of what it means to leave - has reopened the 
case for greater autonomy, or even independence, in Scotland.  
In what follows I will explore three manifestations of this tension between the UK as unitary and the 
UK as union state that flow directly from the referendum and its surprising result: in section II, the 
democratic deficit which persists both in the referendum process and in its outcome; in section III, 
the return of the Scottish independence question; and, in section IV, the call for further devolution 
from the centre as a response to Brexit.  
II. The Union under strain 
/ƚ ǁĂƐŶ ?ƚ ƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ƚŚŝƐ ǁĂǇ ? ĂǀŝĚ ĂŵĞƌŽŶ ?Ɛ three-pronged strategy  W predicated on a 
successful campaign to remain in the EU  W was to call an EU referendum in order to resolve crises 
internal to the Conservative Party. First, he hoped that by calling a referendum he would stave off 
the threat of UKIP in the 2015 General Election. Secondly, he hoped to satisfy  W and in winning the 
referendum even to contain  W the Euroscpetics in his party behind (and to the right of) him. Thirdly, 
he hoped that the prospect of a vote to leave the EU would spook his European counterparts into 
                                                          
1 JDB Mitchell, Constitutional Law (4th edn) (W Green 1964) ch 4. 
2 Nowhere more salient than in the various returns to Direct Rule in Northern Ireland.  
3 ƉŽŝŶƚŵĂĚĞďǇƚŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?EŝĐŽůĂ^ƚƵƌŐĞŽŶ ?ǁŚĞŶůĂƵŶĐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶ
ŽŶĂƌĂĨƚZĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵŝůů ?E^ƚƵƌŐĞŽŶ ? ‘&ŽƌĞǁŽƌĚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐConsultation on a Draft 
Referendum Bill (2016) 1). Contrast the nationwide result - Leave 51.9%; Remain 48.1% - with the Scottish 
votes: Leave 38%; Remain 62%. 
ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵů ĐŽŶĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ŚŝƐ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ ƚŽ ƌĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ continued 
membership.4 The rest, as they say, is history.  
Perhaps the most significant consequence of this failed strategy has been that - by acting primarily 
to face down an internal crisis - the Conservative Government neglected to pay sufficient attention 
to the implications that an unexpected defeat might have outwards, across the union. This omission, 
and its potentially disastrous effects, have been brought into sharp relief in Northern Ireland where 
the loaded question of a hard border across the island (and thus between the EU and the UK) has 
been thrust onto the political agenda. But with regard to Scotland too the Conservative and Unionist 
Party has shown itself to be ignorant to the substantive (for example, the overlap of areas within EU 
and devolved competences) and to the procedural (the possible need to re-open Scotland Act) 
effects of Brexit. Little wonder that - as those effects have revealed themselves - the UK 
GŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƌŚĞƚoric has hardened. When she became Prime Minister, Theresa May very 
intentionally ƉƵƚ ƚŚĞ ƵŶŝŽŶ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ĨƌŽŶƚ ĂŶĚ ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ŽĨ ŚĞƌ ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ?  ‘dŚĞ ǁŽƌĚ  “ƵŶŝŽŶŝƐƚ ? ŝƐ ǀĞƌǇ
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽŵĞ ? ?ƐŚĞƚŽůĚƚŚĞĂƐƐĞŵďůĞĚŵĞĚŝĂĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐŚĞƌĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞYƵĞĞŶ ?ĂƐƐŚĞ
ƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌĞĐŝŽƵƐ ?ƉƌĞĐŝŽƵƐďŽŶĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶŶŐůĂŶĚ ?^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?tĂůĞƐĂŶĚEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ? ?5 As if 
to emphasise this, her first official visit as PM was to Edinburgh where, following a meeting with the 
&ŝƌƐƚDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐŚĞƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ĨƵůůǇĞŶŐĂŐĞĚŝŶŽƵƌĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ?ǁŝƚŚ
the EU], ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ?ǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞƚƌŝŐŐĞƌĞĚ ‘ƵŶƚŝů QǁĞŚĂǀĞh<ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂŶĚŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĨŽƌ
ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?6  
Since then, however, a far more centrist approach has been adopted. As Mark Elliott has said, the 
very clear message delivered at the Conservative Party cŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƌĞǆŝƚ ǁŝůů ďĞ  ‘ĂŶ
executive-led withdrawal process, [intolerant of] interference in that process by either Parliament or 
ƚŚĞĚĞǀŽůǀĞĚ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?7 Nicola Sturgeon has had cause to express her disappointment that the 
Scottish Government has largely been kept out of the loop with regard to the formulation of a UK 
negotiating position;8 meanwhile, at the UK level the Secretary of State for Scotland (as well as his 
Northern Irish and Welsh counterparts) have not been made part of ƚŚĞ ĐĂďŝŶĞƚ ?Ɛ ƌĞǆŝƚ ƐƵď-
ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ĂŶĚ ǁŝůů ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ĂƚƚĞŶĚ  ‘ĂƐ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ? ďǇ ƚŚĞ WƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?9 Not only will Scotland be 
                                                          
4 KŶǁŚŝĐŚƐĞĞ:DƵƌŬĞŶƐ ? ‘ĂǀŝĚĂŵĞƌŽŶ ?ƐƚĂĐƚŝĐƐŵĂǇƚĂŬĞƚŚ h<ŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞh ?ĂŶĚ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞh< ?
British Politics and Policy blog (13 November 2015) < http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/david-camerons-
tactics-may-take-the-uk-out-of-the-eu-and-scotland-out-of-the-uk/>.  
5  ‘^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŶĞǁWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌdŚĞƌĞƐĂDĂǇ ? ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-from-the-new-prime-minister-theresa-may>.  
6  ‘ƌĞǆŝƚ PWDŝƐ “ǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽůŝƐƚĞŶƚŽŽƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŽŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?BBC News (15 July 2016) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-36800536>.  
7 DůůŝŽƚƚ ? ‘dŚĞƌĞƐĂDĂǇ ?Ɛ “'ƌĞĂƚZĞƉĞĂůŝůů ? P^ŽŵĞƉƌĞůŝŵŝŶĂƌǇƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐ ? ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?Public Law for 
Everyone blog <https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2016/10/02/theresa-mays-great-repeal-bill-some-
preliminary-thoughts/>.  
8 ^DĐEĂď ? ‘^ƚƵƌŐĞŽŶ PDĂǇŝŶŶŽƚ “ŚŽŶŽƵƌŝŶŐŚĞƌƉƌŽŵŝƐĞ ?ƚŽ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚŽŶƚĂůŬƐ ?The Scotsman (17 October 
2016) <http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/sturgeon-may-is-not-honouring-her-promise-to-scotland-on-
talks-1-4260095>. These frustrations were not eased by the first high level meeting between the Prime 
DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌĂŶĚŚĞƌtĞůƐŚ ?EŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ/ƌŝƐŚĂŶĚ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƉĂƌƚƐĂƚŽǁŶŝŶŐ^ƚƌĞĞƚ PWtĂŬĞƌ ? ‘^ƚƵƌŐĞŽŶƐĂǇƐ
ƌĞǆŝƚŵĞĞƚŝŶŐǁĂƐ “ĚĞĞƉůǇĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŶŐ ? ?The Guardian (24 October 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/24/nicola-sturgeon-says-brexit-meeting-was-deeply-
frustrating>. 
9 dWĞƚĞƌŬŝŶ ? ‘dŚĞƌĞƐĂDĂǇůĞĂǀĞƐŽƵƚ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇĨƌŽŵƌĞǆŝƚĐĂďŝŶĞƚ ?The Scotsman (14 October 2016) < 
http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/sturgeon-may-is-not-honouring-her-promise-to-scotland-on-talks-1-
4260095>.  
taken out of the EU against its will  W and the Prime Minister has been clear that for Scotland too 
Brexit means Brexit10 - but the process and the shape of Brexit will be determined by a Conservative 
Party with just one Scottish MP (of 59) and by a UK Government that feels comfortable to exclude 
both the Scottish Government and its own Secretary of State for Scotland from the room. Not since 
WŽůůdĂǆŚĂƐƚŚĞĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĚĞĨŝĐŝƚĂƚƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚŽĨƚŚŝƐ ‘ƉƌĞĐŝŽƵƐ ?ƉƌĞĐŝŽƵƐ ?ƵŶŝŽŶŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞĞŶƐŽ
clearly exposed.          
During the passage of the EU Referendum Bill an SNP amendment sought to pre-empt the 
precariousness of this position with the introduction of Ă  ‘ĚŽƵďůĞ-ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ? lock: a requirement 
whereby any UK wide vote to leave the EU would only be given effect in the (highly unlikely) event 
ƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐŵĂƚĐŚĞĚďǇŵĂũŽƌŝƚŝĞƐĨŽƌ ‘ůĞĂǀĞ ?ŝŶĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞƵŶŝŽŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶƚŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? This was an 
ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚ ƉŝƚĐŚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ƵŶŝŽŶ ƐƚĂƚĞ ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? Ɛ ůĞǆ ^ĂůŵŽŶĚ ƚŽůĚ ƚŚĞ ,ŽƵƐĞ ŽĨ Commons, in 
response to the objection that one state might thereby hold the rest of the UK to ransom: 
Nations within a multi-national state should be recognised as more than 
regions, counties or areas and should not be counted by population; they 
are national entities in their own right, and that confers a relationship of 
respect.11 
Whilst the Welsh First Minister, Carwyn Jones, resisted this particular mechanism, the broader union 
state narrative was reaffirmed by his joint communique with Nicola Sturgeon which warned the UK 
Government ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞ  ‘ƵŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞ ? ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞh< to leave the EU against the wishes of the 
people in Scotland or in Wales.12 The amendment was never likely to succeed: the trend in UK 
referendums has been to reach decisions on the basis of a nationwide simple majority, and the 
perception that such mechanisms would have been instrumental to a preferred outcome strongly 
militated against their use.13 As such the response of the UK Government when rejecting the 
amendment  W ƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?ǁ ?ĞĂƌĞŽŶĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁŝůůďĞŽŶĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ QƚŚĂƚǁŝůů
ďĞ ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚ ŽŶ Ă ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚŽƐĞ ǁŚŽ ǀŽƚĞ ?14  W was unsurprising and constitutionally justifiable. 
Nevertheless, the strong assertion by the Scottish Government (and by the SNP group in 
tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ?ƚŚĂƚĂ ‘ĚŽƵďůĞ-ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ? was necessary in order to protect Scotland ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐƐŚŽƵůĚ
be seen as more than mere political grand-standing in pursuit of a lost cause: it spoke to the need 
for new constitutional apparatus in order to take seriously the post-independence referendum 
commitment to a new and more responsive Union.       
These are tensions which have resurfaced in the aftermath of the referendum result. The Scottish 
Government has adopted the view that legislation which seeks to remove the EU law boundary from 
the Scotland Act, or  W as in the case of the Great Repeal Bill  W which seeks to place all EU law 
                                                          
10 ^:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ ? ‘dŚĞƌĞƐĂDĂǇ PEŽ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚŽƉƚ-ŽƵƚŽƌǀĞƚŽĨƌŽŵƌĞǆŝƚ ?The Telegraph (2 October 2016) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/02/theresa-may-no-scotland-opt-out-or-veto-from-brexit/>.  
11 HC Deb 16 June 2015, vol 597, cols 192-193.  
12 D'ĂƌĚŚĂŵ ? ‘^ƚƵƌŐĞŽŶĂŶĚtĞůƐŚ&ŝƌƐƚDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌĂƌǁǇŶ:ŽŶĞƐŝŶ ũŽŝŶƚĐĂůůŽǀĞƌhǀŽƚĞ ?The Herald (3 June 
2015) 
<http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/13411315.Sturgeon_and_Welsh_First_Minister_Carwyn_Jones_in_joi
nt_call_over_EU_vote/>.  
13 Tainted, no doubt, ďǇƚŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌDW'ĞŽƌŐĞƵŶŶŝŶŐŚĂŵ ?Ɛ cynical addition to the 1979 Scottish Devolution 
Referendum of a special majority requirement in order to frustrate devolution from taking hold. 
14  ‘ĂŵĞƌŽŶƌĞũĞĐƚƐ^ƚƵƌŐĞŽŶƵƌŽǀĞƚŽŵŽǀĞ ?The Herald (29 October 2014) 
<http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/13186937.Cameron_rejects_Sturgeon_s_Euro_veto_move/>.  
(including EU law in areas that are in principle devolved) on a statutory footing pending later 
amendment, replacement or repeal, will require the UK Government to seek a legislative consent 
motion (LCM) at Holyrood. There are two important points to be made in relation to this position. 
First, an argument can be (and has been) made that the Sewel Convention  W by which consent will 
 ‘ŶŽƌŵĂůůǇ ?ďĞƐŽƵŐŚƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞh<WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚwishes to make primary 
legislation either in a devolved policy area or to increase or decrease devolved competence15  W is not 
engaŐĞĚŚĞƌĞƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĂƌĞŶŽƚ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ? within the meaning of the convention.16 Such 
arguments should be resisted. In order for the UK to carry the support of its constituent nations 
through Brexit it is essential that the democratic deficit at the centre which has plagued the result 
and its aftermath can now be recovered. Engaging the devolved institutions in the process of 
legislative consent is one meaningful way in which that can begin to happen. Secondly, and as Alan 
Page has said, should UK Ministers be given the power to amend, replace or repeal EU law by way of 
subordinate legislation the absence of any requirement for the Scottish Parliament to be informed 
of, let alone to consent to, the making of such legislation would leave Ă ‘ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŐĂƉŝŶ
the framework of Scottish parliamentary control over UK law making in devolved areas, which the 
^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĂůĞƌƚƚŽƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽĐůŽƐĞ ? ?17 During the passage of the Scotland Bill in 
2012 the Scottish Parliament was able constructively to refuse an LCM in order to encourage the UK 
Government to return to seek consent for an amended Bill on terms more palatable to the devolved 
legislature.18 Whilst it is extremely unlikely that this new dynamic of qualified consent/dissent will 
wring from the UK Government concessions on heavy substantive issues such as ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ access to 
ƚŚĞƐŝŶŐůĞŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ŽŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĂůŝƐƐƵĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ,ŽůǇƌŽŽĚ ?ƐƐƵƉĞƌǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨh<ƐƵďŽƌdinate 
legislation in devolved areas the LCM procedure might provide a useful mechanism by which the 
devolved institutions can insert themselves into and affect the process of leaving the EU.  
III. The means to an end 
During the EU referendum campaign it was a common (albeit contested)19 refrain that should 
Scotland be taken out of EU against its will this would lead inevitably to the dissolution of the union. 
The rise in support for independence during the 2014 Independence Referendum campaign (from 
approximately 24% when the SNP was elected to the Scottish Parliament with a historic majority in 
 ? ? ? ?ƚŽƚŚĞ  ? ?A?ǁŚŽǀŽƚĞĚ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ĂƐǁĞůů as the demographics underlying 
                                                          
15 As set out in Devolution Guidance Note 10 <http://www.gov.scot/Resource/Doc/37349/0066833.pdf>.  
16 House of Lords Constitution Committee, The invoking of Article 50 (4th report 2016/17) para 35. 
17 WĂŐĞ ? ‘The implications of EU withdrawaůĨŽƌƚŚĞĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ? for the Culture, Tourism, Europe 
and External Relations Committee (4 October 2016) para 13. 
18 DĐŽƌŬŝŶĚĂůĞ ? ‘ĐŚŽŚĂŵďĞƌ Pthe 2015 General Election at Holyrood  W ĂǁŽƌĚŽŶ^ĞǁĞů ?Scottish 
Constitutional Futures Forum blog (13 May 2015) 
<http://www.scottishconstitutionalfutures.org/OpinionandAnalysis/ViewBlogPost/tabid/1767/articleType/Arti
cleView/articleId/5594/Chris-McCorkindale-Echo-Chamber-the-2015-General-Election-at-Holyrood-a-word-on-
Sewel.aspx>.  
19 Prior to the referendum it was suggested by Michael Keating and Malcolm Harvey that the most likely driver 
for significant constitutional change would be a result which saw a (narrow) English and Welsh majority vote to 
leave undone by a significant majority for remain in Scotland, in which case the English might willingly let 
^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚŐŽ ?^ĞĞƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐŽĨƚŚĞZŽǇĂů^ŽĐŝĞƚǇŽĨĚŝŶďƵƌŐŚ ?ƐĞǀĞŶƚ ‘dŚĞh<ŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?/ŶŽƌKƵƚ ? ? ? ? ?DĂǇ
2016) <https://www.royalsoced.org.uk/cms/files/events/reports/2016/The-UK-in-Europe_In-or-
Out_Inverness.pdf>.   
that support,20 has kept the question alive, at least in the short-medium term. Furthermore, since 
the referendum in 2014 pro-independence majorities have for the first time been returned by the 
Scottish electorate both to Westminster (where, in 2015, the SNP took 56 of 59 available Scottish 
seats, with 50% of the vote) and to Holyrood (where, in 2016, the SNP (63 seats) and Greens (6 
seats) combine to give a pro-independence majority of 4). Even if, as appeared to be the case at 
Holyrood in 2011,21 the complexion of these chambers reflects the perceived competence of the SNP 
as a party of government (at Holyrood) and opposition (at Westminster) within the union the fact of 
these dual majorities is a further reminder that in its present condition the union remains unstable: 
the unitary state vulnerable to discontent in its northern territory. 
This vulnerability, such as it is, stands in stark contrast to the relative calm which bridged the 
independence and EU referendums. At that point the Scottish question appeared to have been put 
on the back burner. So, the ^EW ?Ɛ ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚŽ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ? 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ƌĞĂĨĨŝƌŵĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ? ďƵƚ ƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚŝƐ ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ QŝƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌ ? P 
making use of Scottish votes at Westminster to ensure that the Smith Commission ?Ɛ ƉƌŽŵŝƐĞ ŽĨ
further devolution is implemented in full.22 Meanwhile, ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚŽĨŽƌ the 2016 Holyrood 
ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ĂƐƐĞƌƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ  ‘right ? (though falling short of an explicit promise to 
exercise that right) to hold a referendum, but with an important qualification: if ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐ ‘ĐůĞĂƌĂŶĚ
sustained evidence that independence has become the preferred option of a majority of the Scottish 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?23  ?ĂƐ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ďǇ  ‘ƌĂŶŐĞ ŽĨ ƉŽůůƐ ŽǀĞƌ Ă ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ŽĨ ƚŝŵĞ ? ?24 or if ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ  ‘Ă ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ĂŶĚ
material change in circumstances that prevailed in  ? ? ? ? ? ?ĐŝƚŝŶŐĂƐĂŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞScotland being taken 
out of the EU against its will.25 The second qualification has of course now been satisfied, and whilst 
the referendum outcome has not (at the time of writing) had a significant impact on support for 
independence,26 the SNP took the decision to include a Draft Referendum Bill in their programme for 
government. That bill has now been published for consultation. However, there remain significant 
political and constitutional hurdles to cross before such a bill can become law.       
As a minority government the implementation by the SNP of any referendum commitment will 
require support from elsewhere in the chamber. On this question the manifesto of their only natural 
ally  W the Scottish Greens  W was more ambiguous, making no explicit promise to campaign for a 
second referendum but committing themselves to campaign for independence should such a 
referendum take place.27 dŚŝƐ ŚƵƌĚůĞ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚ ůŽǁĞƌĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ 'ƌĞĞŶƐ ? ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ
commitment to vote with the SNP should they decide to introduce a Referendum Bill, and to do so 
                                                          
20 :ƵƌƚŝĐĞ ? ‘^ŽtŚŽsŽƚĞĚzĞƐĂŶĚtŚŽsŽƚĞĚEŽ ? ?What Scotland Thinks (26 September 2014) < 
http://blog.whatscotlandthinks.org/2014/09/voted-yes-voted/>. 
21 DĐŽƌŬŝŶĚĂůĞ ? ‘ŶĐĐŝĚĞŶƚĂůZĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ?Scottish Constitutional Futures blog (16 August 2016) 
<http://www.scottishconstitutionalfutures.org/OpinionandAnalysis/ViewBlogPost/tabid/1767/articleType/Arti
cleView/articleId/2040/Christopher-McCorkindale-An-Accidental-Referendum.aspx>.  
22 Scottish National Party manifesto, Stronger for Scotland (2015) 35. 
23 Scottish National Party manifesto, Re-elect Nicola Sturgeon (2016) 23. 
24 'DĐWŚĞƌƐŽŶ ? ‘EŝĐŽůĂ^ƚƵƌŐĞŽŶƐĂǇƐ “ƌĂŶŐĞŽĨƉŽůůƐ ?ƐŚŽǁŝŶŐŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝƐƚƌŝŐŐĞƌĨŽƌ
referendum re-ƌƵŶ ?The Courier (2 May 2016) <https://www.thecourier.co.uk/fp/news/politics/scottish-
politics/165004/nicola-sturgeon/>. 
25 SNP 2016 manifesto (n 23) 23. 
26 :ƵƌƚŝĐĞ ? ‘,ŽǁƌĞǆŝƚ,ĂƐ W and Has Not  W DĂĚĞĂŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?What Scotland Thinks (18 September 2016) 
<http://blog.whatscotlandthinks.org/2016/09/how-brexit-has-and-has-not-made-a-difference/>.  
27 Scottish Greens manifesto, Scotland Can (2016) <https://greens.scot/scotland-can>.   
without using their votes to win concessions in other policy areas.28 By way of contrast, it has been 
reported that the Prime Minister would strongly consider blocking29 or delaying30 any second 
independence referendum proposed by the Scottish Government in the wake of Brexit, and the 
response of Number 10 to the consultation exercise has been to deny that there is a mandate for 
one to be held.31 Given the principled considĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ'ƌĞĞŶƐ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŵƉůŝĞƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚfor a 
second independence referendum in the lifetime of the Parliament, and therefore that there is a 
parliamentary mandate for one to be called) as well as the pragmatic considerations (the risk that a 
veto or the manipulation of the referendum might further the nationalist cause)32 in play, this is a 
position that might well prove to be untenable.     
Of course, a political mandate to act does not necessarily align with the legal power to do so.  
Regardless of the mandate doctrine, any Referendum Act  ‘ŝƐŶŽƚůĂǁ ? to the extent that inter alia it 
 ‘ƌĞůĂƚĞƐ ƚŽ ? Ă ƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚ ŵĂƚƚĞƌ33 (here  ‘ƚŚĞ hŶŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ <ŝŶŐĚŽŵƐ ŽĨ ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ĂŶĚ ŶŐůĂŶĚ ? ?)34 
tŚĞƚŚĞƌůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ƌĞůĂƚĞƐƚŽ ?ĂƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚŵĂƚƚĞƌŝƐƚŽďĞĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚ ‘by reference to the purpose of 
ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶ ? ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ƌĞŐĂƌĚ  ?ĂŵŽŶŐ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ? ƚŽ ŝƚƐĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŝŶ Ăůů ƚŚĞ ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ? ?35 For the 
Scottish Government  W who notably did not qualify the right of the Scottish Parliament to legislate 
with the requirement of a prior transfer of competence from Westminster  W a Referendum Bill is 
already ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ?ĂĚŽƉƚŝŶŐĂŶĂƌƌŽǁƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨ ƚŚĞ
legislation,36 its purpose is not to affect the Union but rather to seek (in an advisory referendum) 
 ‘ƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƐŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚŽŶĂƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞǁĂǇ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚŝƐŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚ ? ?37 its legal effect, 
to enable that referendum to take place.38 For the UK Government, ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ĂŶĚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ? ŽĨ
legislation must be read more broadly than for its direct legal effects, so as ƚŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ‘ƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůŽƌ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚƵƚĞǁĂƐĞŶĂĐƚĞĚ ƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞ ? ?39 Given that the First Minister has 
said she will only call a referendum where a series of polls demonstrate significant support for 
                                                          
28 ><ŝƌŬĂůĚǇ ? ‘WĂƚƌŝĐŬ,ĂƌǀŝĞƌƵůĞƐŽƵƚƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽĞǆƚƌĂĐƚĐŽŶĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ^EWŝŶƌĞƚƵƌŶĨŽƌďĂĐŬŝŶŐ
ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞďŝůů ?Holyrood Magazine (24 October 2016) 
<https://www.holyrood.com/articles/news/exclusive-patrick-harvie-rules-out-trying-extract-concessions-snp-
return-backing>.  
29 'ƌŝĐĞ ? ‘dŚĞƌĞƐĂDĂǇƌƵůĞƐŽƵƚƐĞĐŽŶĚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵŽŶ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ?The Independent (15 July 
2016) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-theresa-may-scottish-independence-
referendum-rules-out-second-a7139391.html>. 
30 See quotes by Conservative MSP, Adam Tomkins, regarding the use of the section 30 order to delay any 
referendum, in J MitchĞůů ? ‘^ƚƵƌŐĞŽŶ PdŽƌŝĞƐƉůĂŶƚŽƐƚŝƚĐŚƵƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ?The Sunday Times (23 October 2016) 
<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/sturgeon-tories-plan-to-stitch-up-referendum-k80rbh6ng>.  
31  ‘^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚůĂƵŶĐŚĞƐŶĞǁďŝůůĨŽƌŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ?STV News (20 October 2016) 
<http://stv.tv/news/politics/1370450-scottish-government-launches-bill-for-second-referendum/>.  
32 ^:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ ? ‘ZƵƚŚĂǀŝĚƐŽŶ PEĞǆƚWDƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďůŽĐŬ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?AM
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/03/ruth-davidson-next-pm-should-not-block-scottish-
independence-ref/>.  
33 Scotland Act 1998, s 29(3). 
34 Scotlad Act 1998, sch 5, Pt I, 1(b). 
35 Scotland Act 1998, s 29(3). 
36 Scotland Act 1998, s 101. 
37 Such was the long title of the Draft Bill prepared in advance of the 2014 referendum. 
38 &ŽƌĂŵŽƌĞĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚŝƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐĞĞ'ŶĚĞƌƐŽŶĞƚĂů ? ‘dŚĞ/ŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞZĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ?>ĞŐĂůŝƚǇ
and the Contested Constitution: WideniŶŐƚŚĞĞďĂƚĞ ?UK Constitutional Law Association blog (31 January 
2012) <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/01/31/gavin-anderson-et-al-the-independence-referendum-
legality-and-the-contested-constitution-widening-the-debate/>. 
39 PW Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (5th edn) (Thomson Carswell 2007) para 15.5(d). For more detail on 
the application of s29(3) see A Page, Constitutional Law of Scotland (W Green 2015) 124-128. 
independence, those purposes seem clear enough. With such a degree of ambiguity it is inevitable 
that, if the Scottish Government was to introduce legislation absent a transfer of legislative 
competence, the matter would make its way to the UK Supreme Court, either by way of a pre-
enactment reference by the UK (and possibly in conjunction with the Scottish) Law Officers,40 or by 
way of a post-enactment challenge raised by a private party.        
The legal basis of the 2014 referendum was put beyond doubt by an agreement reached between 
the Scottish and UK Governments explicitly and temporarily to exclude that poll from the schedule 
of reserved powers.41 This was achieved by way of a transfer of competence by Order-in-Council 
made under section 30 of the Scotland Act. In light of the uncertain prospects for a Referendum Bill 
before the Supreme Court it makes sense that the Scottish Government has stated its  ‘expectation ? 
that an order and agreement would again be sought in advance of a second referendum.42 For our 
purposes, however, the key point is this: that ŝŶƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁa section 30 order is 
(and in 2013 was) a purely pragmatic mechanism (a means of protecting the referendum and its 
result from judicial review) rather than one arising from constitutional necessity. Notwithstanding 
the experience of the previous referendum, the constituent nation has reserved for itself the right  W 
ŝŶĚĞĞĚ ?ŝŶĂƌĞĐĞŶƚƌĂĚŝŽŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĨŽƌZĂĚŝŽ ? ?ƐToday programme the First Minister has called it her 
duty - to respond where the unitary state is seen to abuse its power either by harming Scottish 
interests as a result of the negotiations to leave the EU  ?ĐŝƚŝŶŐĂƐ ‘ƌĞĚůŝŶĞƐ ?ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨ the single 
market and protections for EU citizens and for Scottish workers)43 or by seeking to prevent a 
resulting and politically mandated referendum from taking place at all.  
So begins a fascinating dance in which the Scottish Government will use the implicit threat of 
unilateral legislation in order to force the UK Government from its current trajectory towards a (so-
ĐĂůůĞĚ ? ‘ŚĂƌĚ ?ƌĞǆŝƚ ?dŚŝƐŝƐŚŝŐŚƐƚĂŬĞƐďƌŝŶŬŵĂŶƐŚŝƉ ?KŶƚŚĞŽŶĞŚĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĞh<'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŚĂƐƚŚƵƐ
far refused to blink, stating that there will be no opt-out or exceptional status for Scotland with 
regards either to immigration or to the single market.44 On the other hand, by publishing for 
consultation a draft Referendum Bill the Scottish Government will hope that  W as the ill-effects of 
Brexit begin to manifest  W public opinion will tip in favour of independence, all the while daring the 
UK Government or the UK Supreme Court to block the enabling referendum legislation. Somewhere 
in the middle lie three more likely ŽƉƚŝŽŶƐ P ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚĂ ‘ƐŽĨƚĞƌ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƌĞǆŝƚ W possibly one which 
creates for Scotland (and for Northern Ireland) a special status  W can be agreed and pursued by the 
UK and the devolved governments; (2) that where the positions of the respective governments 
become entrenched the 2014 model can be adopted in order for the UK and devolved governments 
to put any resulting referendum on a solid legal footing; (3) that political support for independence 
                                                          
40 Scotland Act 1998, s 33. 
41 Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government and the Scottish 
Government on a referendum on independence for Scotland (15 October 2012) 
<http://www.gov.scot/About/Government/concordats/Referendum-on-independence>.   
42 Consultation on a Draft Referendum Bill (n 3) 3. 
43 d'ŽƌĚŽŶ ? ‘EŝĐŽůĂ^ƚƵƌŐĞŽŶƚŽƉƵďůŝƐŚƉůĂŶĨŽƌ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚƚŽƐƚĂǇŝŶƐŝŶŐůĞŵĂƌŬĞƚĂĨƚĞƌƌĞǆŝƚ ? ? ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ
2016) 
<http://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/14805314.Nicola_Sturgeon_to_publish_plan_for_Scotland_to_stay
_in_single_market_after_Brexit/?ref=rss>.  
44 <^ĐŚŽĨŝĞůĚ ? ‘dŚĞƌĞƐĂDĂǇƌĞũĞĐƚƐEŝĐŽůĂ^ƚƵƌŐĞŽŶ ?ƐŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƐŝŶŐůĞŵĂƌŬĞƚĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ ?Politics Home 
(17 October) <https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/constitution/scottish-
parliament/news/79921/theresa-may-rejects-nicola-sturgeons-immigration>.   
ĨĂŝůƐƚŽŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐĞůĞĂǀŝŶŐƚŚĞ^EWƚŽůŽďďǇƚŚĞh<'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĨŽƌĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƐƚŚĞh< ?Ɛ
EU obligations are unravelled. Wherever the chips fall it is clear that dissensus in and between its 
constituent parts is ĚƌŝǀŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h< ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? dŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă  ‘ŚĂƌĚ ?
Brexit  W ŽƌŽŶĞĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ- will inevitably and severely test the rigidity of 
the unitary state. In order to survive it is likely that the autonomy of the nations will require to be 
enhanced further still.         
IV. Towards a new Unionism 
An alternative view of Brexit  W one that has been put by unionists and nationalists alike - is that far 
from threatening the union we are instead presented with a unique opportunity to augment 
devolution beyond the substantial transfer of powers that already flow from the Scotland Acts 2012 
and 2016. First, because ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ is a  ‘retaining model ? of devolution, the repatriation of power 
from the EU to the UK ought to begin with the presumption that powers which are exercised at the 
EU level in subject areas which are in principle devolved - notably in the spheres of agriculture, 
fisheries and the environment45 - will revert to Edinburgh without any requirement to re-open the 
Scotland Act. Secondly, the freedom of the Scottish Government to act and the Scottish Parliament 
to legislate in the devolved sphere will be greatly enhanced by the repeal of the EU law boundary to 
legislative and executive competence.46 Thirdly, Brexit might also present opportunities for the 
devolved institutions to lobby Westminster for yet more powers (for example, the devolution of 
VAT47 or of powers to implement a distinct Scottish immigration policy) during the course of 
negotiations. In the view of the former SNP Cabinet Secretary, Alex Neil, the Scottish Government 
ŚĂƐďĞĞŶƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĂ ‘ŐŽůĚĞŶŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƚŽůŽďďǇĨŽƌŵŽƌĞƉŽǁĞƌƐĂŶĚŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŽŶ
such a scale as to amount to (what he callƐ ?  ‘ŶĞŽ-ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ? ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝĚĞĂůƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵ ? ?ŚĞŚĂƐƐĂŝĚ ?
 ‘ĨŽƌĂĚǀĂŶĐŝŶŐĨƵůůƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇĨŽƌƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶƚŚĞĞĂƌůǇ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? ?48 For Jim Gallagher, both 
independence and the centripetal repatriation of EU powers should be resisted. Instead, Gallagher 
has argued that the return of policy making to Holyrood in areas such as fisheries and the 
environment  W as well as the potential for the bespoke devolution of international relations, EU 
affairs or immigration  W would give ƚŽƚŚĞĚĞǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ‘ĂŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƌĞĂů
ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ?ĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚ require the UK to work constructively with the devolved institutions in those 
areas through improved mechanisms for inter-governmental relations.49  
Whatever the end  W an independent Scotland or (what Gallagher calls) a different kind of United 
Kingdom  W there are reasons of principle and of practice why we should be cautious in adopting the 
suggested means (the transfer of further powers) in order to achieve them. The principled objection 
                                                          
45 J Gallagher, Britain after Brexit: Toxic referendums and territorial constitutions (11 October 2016) 6 
<http://ggcpp.nuff.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Britain-after-Brexit-Toxic-Referendums-and-
Territorial-Constitutions.pdf>.  
46 Page (n 17) para 9. 
47 The Smith Commission resolved only to assign a portion of VAT to the Scottish Ministers as EU law does not 
allow differentiated rates to be applied within a member state. Lord Smith of Kelvin, Report of the Smith 
Commission for further devolution of Powers to the Scottish Parliament (27 November 2014) para 84 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20151202171017/http://www.smith-commission.scot/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/The_Smith_Commission_Report-1.pdf>.  
48 EĞŝů ? ‘,ŽǁŵǇƉĂƌƚǇůĞĂĚĞƌEŝĐŽůĂ^ƚƵƌŐĞŽŶĐŽƵůĚŐĞƚ ‘ŶĞŽ-independence from Brexit  W without another 
ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ?The Telegraph (25 September 2016) < http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/25/how-my-
party-leader-nicola-sturgeon-could-get-neo-independence-f/>. 
49 Gallagher 2016 (n 45) 8-9.  
stems from the reactive way in which Scottish devolution has emerged and evolved. This is to say 
that the dynamic which has driven devolution in Scotland has been the reflexive impulse to devolve 
powers (and then more powers still) from the centre as the antidote to incremental gains by Scottish 
nationalists. The Kilbrandon Commission, from which came the aborted Scotland Act 1978, was 
ĐŽŶǀĞŶĞĚ ŝŶ ƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚŽƐĞ ĐĂůůƐ ĨŽƌ ŚŽŵĞ ƌƵůĞ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĨŽůůŽǁĞĚ tŝŶŶŝĞ ǁŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ,ĂŵŝůƚŽŶ ďǇ-
election win for the SNP in 1967. Two decades later we were told (in the now infamous words of 
George Robertson) ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚĐƚ ? ? ? ?ǁŽƵůĚ ‘Ŭŝůů
ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵƐƚŽŶĞĚĞĂĚ ? ?dŚĞĂůŵĂŶ Commission, which preceded the Scotland Act 2012 and (what 
the then Secretary of State for Scotland described as being)  ‘ƚŚĞůĂƌŐĞƐƚĞǀĞƌƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌŽĨĨŝƐĐĂůƉŽǁĞƌƐ
ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞh< ? ?ǁĂƐŝƚƐĞůĨĂƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ^EW ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶǁŝŶŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚŝlst the Smith 
Commission and the significant devolution given effect by the Scotland Act 2016 are a direct result 
ŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƌƌŽǁĞƌƚŚĂŶĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ‘ŶŽ ?ǀŽƚĞŝŶƚŚĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ? 
In none of the above cases has the transfer of power scratched the itch of nationalist agitators. 
Instead attention has turned to those powers that remain out of reach and which might next be 
forthcoming. In each of these cases that which was missing (consensus amongst the Kilbrandon 
Commissioners; the SNP and the Conservative Party from the Scottish Constitutional Convention; 
the SNP again from the Calman Commission; the public from the Smith Commission) has 
undermined, to a greater or lesser extent, the legitimacy of that which was proposed. With the 
independence question reignited by divided majorities in Scotland (as well as in Northern Ireland) as 
compared to England and Wales the real opportunity we have been afforded is not (necessarily) to 
ask what more can come the way of Holyrood and Victoria Quay in order to stem the tide, but 
instead to take a step back and to review in a more fundamental, more inclusive and more 
participatory  process the founding principles and the architecture of devolution, as well as the 
principles which guide the division of competences as between the centre and the devolved 
institutions. 
The practical objection is one of capacity, and this in two senses. First, contrary to those who argued 
ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁ ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ ƚŽ ĚŽ  ‘ƉƌĞĐŝŽƵƐ ůŝƚƚůĞ ?50 by way of law-making the 
experience from the get go has been of a hyper-active Parliament: an average of 15 ASPs per year 
stands in stark contrast to the four or five Scottish Acts passed each year in the ten which preceded 
devolution.51 This has required the government to set its (extremely tight) legislative programme 2-3 
ǇĞĂƌƐŝŶĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŽĨŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨD^WƐĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞůǇƚŽƉĞƌĨŽƌŵƚŚĞWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
scrutiny function has been hindered both by the sheer volume of legislation,52 as well as by the 
culture of strong party discipline which, it has been said, in a unicameral legislature with a relatively 
small number of members iŶŚŝďŝƚƐ ‘ƚŚĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞŽĨŵŝŶĚĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇĨŽƌĚĞƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚ
                                                          
50 J McCluskie ? ‘EĞǁĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽh<ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞĚƌĂĨƚŝŶŐ PƚŚĞǀŝĞǁĨƌŽŵ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Statute Law 
Review 136, 138-139. 
51 WĂŐĞ ? ‘KŶĞ>ĞŐĂů^ǇƐƚĞŵ ?dǁŽ>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞƐ P^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ>Ăǁ-DĂŬŝŶŐĨƚĞƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶDĐ,ĂƌŐĂŶĚd
Mullen (eds), Public Law in Scotland (Avizandum 2006) 11-12. 
52 In its 3rd report, The Founding Principles of the Scottish Parliament: the application of Access and 
Participation, Equal Opportunities, Accountability and Power Sharing in the work of the Parliament (Scottish 
Parliamentary Paper 818 ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞWƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞǁĂƌŶĞĚŽĨ ‘ĐůĞĂƌĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ
system in the Scottish Parliament is under severe pressure of work, and that the quality of output is 
ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶĞĚ ?ĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ ?ĂƚƉĂƌĂ ? ? ? ? ? 
and genuine self-ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ƚŽ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇ ? ?53 These assessments were made 
before the full effects of further devolution in the Scotland Acts 2012 and 2016 have made 
themselves known, let alone the demands that will be made by the repatriation of powers following 
Brexit. It seems highly likely that more  W and more complex  W powers, which will require a greater 
volume and (in light of the the transfer of significant tax varying and tax creation powers) perhaps 
even a greater degree of parliamentary scrutiny, will only place further strain on the legislative 
timetable. Without careful thought about the capacity of the Scottish Parliament the effectiveness of 
the scrutiny ĂĨĨŽƌĚĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ is likely to suffer, to the detriment of 
Holyrood ?s legislative output. Secondly, with the shift from a tax spending to a tax raising 
parliament, the capacity of the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament to exercise new (let 
alone existing) functions is likely to be hampered by Brexit in the medium to long term by producing 
a shrinking and less affluent tax base.    
We should be wary then  W as we ought to have been during the rush to the Smith Commission and 
through that forum to the Scotland Act 2016  W of embracing more devolved powers without also 
thinking about the structures which surround their exercise and scrutiny. Does the Scottish 
Parliament need - as the outgoing Presiding Officer, Trisha Marwick, has suggested54 - a second 
chamber to provide the independent and detached scrutiny referred to by Lord Hope? Are more 
MSPs required within the unicameral chamber in order to create the space within which a strong(er) 
backbench culture might emerge? Should we reform the committee system in order to create there 
a more robust forum for scrutiny? What of the legislative procedure: do we need more or different 
legislative stages (in one chamber or in two) in order to enhance the quality of ASPs which are 
submitted for Royal Assent? Is the machinery for Inter-Governmental Relations fit for purpose? How 
might the devolved institutions routinely feed into policy discussions on reserved matters that 
nevertheless have significant effects on the devolution settlement? Whatever the answers to these 
questions, and there are many more besides, the point is that the constitutional rupture created by 
Brexit will require us to reflect upon the radical substantive changes to devolution that have taken 
place since the Scotland Act 1998 came into force and to think about the structural work that 
remains to be done within Scotland and between Scotland and the rest of the UK in order best to 
accommodate them.            
V. Conclusion 
More than three months after the historic decision was taken to leave the EU the meaning and the 
shape of Brexit remain less than clear. What we can say with some certainty is that the top down 
ŝŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ  ‘ŚĂƌĚ ?ƌĞǆŝƚǁŝůůďĞ ŝŶƚŽůĞƌĂďůĞĨŽƌƚŚŽƐĞŶĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚǀŽƚĞĚƚŽƌĞŵĂŝŶ ŝŶƚŚĞh ? 
From Scotland, where the electorate voted to remain in the EU, where the vast majority of the 
Members of both the Scottish Parliament and of the House of Commons are pro-EU, and where the 
^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŚĂƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĂƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞĚĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƉŽŝŶƚƚŽƚŚĞŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?s hard 
line on immigration (with its knock on effect for our prospects in the single market) the threat to the 
UK is clear. The demand for greater scrutiny by Holyrood even over UK secondary legislation, the 
                                                          
53 >ŽƌĚ,ŽƉĞ ? ‘tŚĂƚĂƐĞĐŽŶĚĐŚĂŵďĞƌĐĂŶĚŽĨŽƌůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Statute Law Review 3, 8. For a 
more detailed assessment of the effectiveness of legislative scrutiny in the Scottish Parliament see Page (2015) 
(n 39) 217-219.  
54  ‘WƌĞƐŝĚŝŶŐKĨĨŝĐĞƌĐĂůůƐ ĨŽƌƐĞĐŽŶĚĐŚĂŵďĞƌĨŽƌ,ŽůǇƌŽŽĚ ?BBC News (9 March 2016) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-35761663>.  
assertion by the Scottish Government ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛright to legislate for an 
independence referendum even in the face of UK reticence, and the demand for greater autonomy 
even in areas that are traditionally reserved to the UK, such as immigration and foreign affairs, may 
offend a still pervasive unitary state instinct, but for those politicians and officials who operate at the 
centre the stakes could not be higher: to adapt once more in the face of a clear democratic deficit, 
or for the constitution finally to buckle under the strain of its split identity.                           
